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More intensive use in prosperity
It has often been supposed that when thequantity of goods or services
sold by a business enterprise increases, thcnianagers of the enterprise
ordinarily must increase their stock of equipmentto cope with the
growth of sales. In the railway industry, it might besupposed, an expan-
sion of ton-miles requiresan increase in the aggregate (aI)acitv of goods
wagons (railway freight cars. an expansion of travel requires an in-
crease in the capacity of carriages (railwaypassenger cars), and an
expansion of total trafficcannot he handlcd without an increase in
motive power. The supply of rollingstock, it is implied, will be adjusted
to the level of traffic.
There arc, of course, grounds for questioningwhethcr these conse-
quences must always or even usually occur. The supplyof equipment
at the beginning of a traffic expansion mighthe large enough to take
care of the growth of trallic. It might be possibleto use thc initial eqttip-
ment more efficiently. Even if railwaymanagers feel that additional
rolling stock is needed theymay not he able to get it, for it takes time
to build cars and locomotives, and the-may not arrive from the con-
struction shops until the boom isover. On the downswing, railway
managers will certainly not reduce the stock ofequipment in proportion
to the fall in traffic. Perhaps theywill junk some archaicor badly worn
vehicles, but they will keep therest, anticipating a return of prosperity,
unless they think the decline intraffic is quasi-permanentand not merely
cyclical.
In fact the changes in the supplyof rolling stock have usuallybeen
much smaller than those in traflic,and have often been inthe opposite
direction. The size of the freightcar stock ('svagon park''shows little
positive relation to cycles inton-miles. We havecontinuous figures on
railroad-owned wagons only,although privately-ownedrail wagonsmostly for coal) played an important part iii freight movement; they
were almost as numerous as those belonging to the railroads (Table 1 8
TABLE1 8
Privately-Owned and Railway-Owned Goods Wagons IFreight Cars)
I)ates arc those of special censuses.
l)ates are most nearly comparable ones available. Figures include brake vans.
It does not seem likely, however, that the percentage changes in either
stock during any phase of traffic was much greater than that in tile
other. At an' rate, the railroad stock, although it gre\%' in eachexpan-
sion before World \Var I, never rncrcascd by as large a percentage as
traffic; after the war it actually shrank (Table 19)Ton-iiiile,l)CF
wagon in stock must have increased in every expansion. The number
of wagons diminished in only tvo contra ctions, and then by a lesser per-
centage than traffic. The amount of traffic handled in a typical wagon
during the course of a month must have clinhinishe(l in every contraction.
TABLE19
Freight Traffic and Number of Railway-Owned Wagons
Per Cent Change between Peak and Trough Years n Freight Traffic
1873-1908, 1921-1938
Tons conveyed, I 873-1908: net ton-miles 1921-38.
Number of wagons for each year was computed by averacing numbers at hein-










1874-77 12.5 8.6 1877-78 --2.5 1.6
1878-83 28.9 15.0 1883-86 -4.4 10.9
1886-91 2L9 15.7 1891-93 -5.5 7.5
1893-1900 11.9 18.3 1900-01 -2.1 1.9
1901-07 24.0 5.5 1907-08 -4.7 1.0
1921-24 43.4 -5.1 1924.26 0.6
1926-27 34.2 -0.2 192 7-28 -5.9 _1 .0
1928-29 6.3 -1.2 1929-3 2 -20.8 --4.0
1932-37 23.1 -2.6 19$ 7-38 --9.3 2.1
PRIVATE.' RAii.WA\'
.\tig.I, 1918 628,344 Dcc. .11. 1919 3(1I6
.\ut. I,1 ¶)23 6.18,215 Dec. .11, 1928 7U6)$ I
July 28, 1937 637,670 Dcc. 3!, 1937 656,834Railway coaches weremore intensively used in years of large than
in year-s of small travel. During expansions in travel for whichwe have
data. the number ofcars and their seating capacity either diminislw(1,
Utjncreased by a smaller percentage than the number of
n con ractions, the fall in the number of travelers was :tlwavsgreater
than tire decline, ifan', in the number of cars and seats; indeed the
ra ii!-oads actually increased the seating caj)a(-itva little inthree such
phases (]ablc 20).
TAtLE20
Passenger Journeys, Number of PassengerVehicles, and Number of Seots
Per Cent Change between Peakand Trough Years in Journeys, 1920-1938
rxpANsIoxs
Per cent change Per Cent chiane
Jour- I 'e- Jour- Fe-
Dates nevsblie!'Vents' Dater ;csbhiele'Seats'
92(1-222U.1 .1) j.
922-23 1.31.20.1 1923-2613.1) 3.7 192629! 10.6 LI 2.5 1929-328.74.21.4
1929-3210.05.01.9 1932-37 13.5- 3.7 1937-4025.31.2 0.3
Includes Londen underground railways,1920-32; excludes thcii, 1929-38
Includes journe a ofseason ticket holders.
Number for each Year computedby averaging number at beginningand end of that year. Percrntage change-computed from these averages.
Journeys, including Londonunderground, did not contract in 1927-28.
We can't make directcomparisons between traffic and thenumber
of locomotives;on the one hand, lacking dataon passenger niilcs, we
can't Set up a compositemeasure of freight and passengermovement, and on the other. statisticson the stock of enginesarc not subdivided
in accordance with theservice to which engineswere assigned. But the
total number of steamlocomotives declined almostcontinuously from 1920 to 1938 (Chart 18).Performance per locomotivemust have increased whenaggregate traffic was growing. Thefall, if any, in the stock of engines duringa contraction of travelor of ton-miles was
always gradual. BetweenNovcrnhei' 1929,a peak, and the second
quarter of 1933, a trough in ton-miles,the number in stockdeclind from 23,497 (average forOctober, November,and December) to 21,454 (average for thequarter), a fall of 9per cent. A similarcorn-
40putation for thc somewhat different dates of the pselIgel contraction
likewise yields a fall of 9 pci' cent. In all other contractions of freight or
traffic the number of locomotives declined 1 per cent or less.
\Vhcnever traIllc expanded, then, the railroads were able to handle
more and more of it per car or locomotive on hand. \Vhcnevcr it con-
tracted, thegot less and less remunerative work out of a typical unit
of equipment. Rising traffic was accompanied by more intenSivc, and
falling traffic by less intensive use. This can happen in either, or both,
of two ways. The amount of work performed by an average car or
locomotive during each hour of use niav be higher in prosperity, because
of heavier loading or faster movement or vehicles may be kept iu Lise
during a greater percentage of the time, and spend fewer hours standing
idle.
Heavier carloads and frainloads; but slower movement in
freiQht service
In the movement of goods, the average weight loaded into a car
increased and diminished with aggregate ton-miles (Chart 12)' These
variations may reflect changes in the average weights to which the
various kinds of traflic are loaded, or changes in the relative importance
of heavily arid lightly loaded species, or 1)0th. Data on loads are avail-
able for the three major subdivisions of ton-miles. They suggest that,
in at least two instances, changes in composition must account for the
fluctuation in the overall figure. In 1923-26, except at the very end,
the average load of each component rose (general merchandise not
conspicuously, but it did not decline either) ,vet the all-commodity
average fell. In 1927-28, one component fell, then rose, one increased
throughout, the third was steady, vet the average for all three declined
continuously. In all other phases, however, changes in at least one of
the components contributed to the characteristic change in the overall
figure. Except at the coal strike troughs, the amplitude of the changes
was rather small.2
From 1927 onward, marshalling yard staffs and others responsible
for the make-up of trains were able to switch more and more loaded
In discussing average loads and other operating statistics we rely on quarterly rather
than monthly data after 1931, for reasons e,plaincd in the note or, sources at the
end of this paper.
The sharp exceptional declines in the all-commodity averages rrsulted Primarily
from the virtual disappearance of the heavily-loaded coal traffic.
41A1 12
Aveicige Wagon Load (Net Ton-m;Iesper toaded Wagon Mile)




t3L 5ded ercd are contrac!jcin tnn-rniles (elI ccnalie5)
AU ccmrndjtjescars into an average train as aggregate traffic swelled; when the latter
diminished the average loadcd length hecarne shorter (Chart 13
).In
earlier phases the sequence of change was less regular. At the coal strike
troughs, trains were lengthened enormously. Perhaps railwaymanagers,
confronted with a shortage of locomotive fuel, made unusual efforts, by
lengthening trains, to get a maximum of work out of each engine.3
Except near the trough, the change in 1920-21 and 192 1-24 wasnor-
mal by the standard of later cycles. The mild risc in the last half of
1921-24 did not persist; during most of the 1924-26 contraction the
curve is flat, although it does not fall. The 1926-27 period violated the
rule throughout; but coal production did not recover its normal level
until near the end of this brief expansion (Chart 2).
Partly because of the changes in the average wagon-load and partly
because of those in wagons per train, the average trainload became
heavier in expansions and lighter in contractions of traffic (Chart 14).
We can pair a cycle in ton-miles per train mile with each cycle in
aggregate ton-miles. (At the 1921 and 1926 troughs the change in
loaded length tended to counteract the effect on the average trainload
of the change in tons per car, hut the latter was more powerful.)
If the average speed of trains were constant, the cyclical variation
in the trainload would mean that ton-miles per hour of train move-
ment would increase in expansion and decrease in contraction. The
labor of train crews would become more productive in the former and
less productive in the latter. But in fact the movement of trains was,
on the whole, accelerated in contraction and retarded in expansion,
although the change was very irregular in 1924-26 and 1928.29
(Chart 15). Apparently greater density of traffic resulted in increased
congestion and delay, and shrinkage of traffic permitted more free-
dom of movement. The changes in speed tended to counteract the
effect of the changes in trainload on the work that could he acconi-
plished in an hour. Indeed, there was no consistent relation between
ton-miles per train-hour and aggregate volume (Chart 16).
Since there arc no data on passenger-miles or passenger car-miles,
we cannot compute passenger-miles per car-mile, car-miles per train-
mile, or passenger-miles per traiti-mile. We caui infer a good deal, how-
ever, about what happened to the last-mentioned ratio. Its numerator,
Another possible surmise is that trains composed primarily of coal traffic are nor-
nially shoner than other trains and that the especially sharp cessation of this traffic
therefore increased the average lcngth.
-13l4
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5 neercds Ore contrac in Icnmi'e
CHART 14
Average Train road (Net Ton-milesper Freight Train Mle}
January 1 920-First Quarter 1939
T-m. çer 1r in.



























Freight Train Miles per Freight Train Hour
January 1920-First Quarter 1939
Sd;d ;ercs are eortrt:L c-in
CHART 16
Net Ton-miles per Freight Train Hour
January 1 920-First Quarter 1939
Shajed perinds are contracI:one in tan-miles
-1
24 26 '29 '33 '32 '34 '36 '3iigif(i'a((i)ssingiI-l)Iil(, i'tlI('ttit1iiiiitiiil l)141tlt4)1(lIe
titiles j111evate! tile iitiiuthei uIj01lI1I('v, Itis hot 1iI'iv tht tin' '\('ftgeit'tli ofjouriiev ilIU,tase(fiii cotittat Lions of travel,wltiuli lottlih (OttI(i(ledvIL1I (l)Ittl';l(Liotis iiihitsijiess. OttIIIi(i)iIlriitt', !1Rl itvaiiriijtis Iik('lv tihit 1M1)k(l0hi,rd ;tnil took sliott.r
j0lIrilrs. Its'tllg(tt11jI(J)loI)ilhiy (!iiiiiiiishetl hat('atrI' j)('leu'lltage thatitIIt'inniihe,' oftrIPS.haiii-itiik.s, 4)11 tilt otlutliaiiti, (lillIjhlNii('(1
V('I Viittk' or aefliailviiIcr(ase(l (Ciiatt 17). WithI)a\serlger-niilesfall- lug ahl(Itraiti-uiiiles virtiiilly(olistatit or rising, passetlgi't-nijksper tuilill-t11!i(' lutist have(leoteasedill other %0r(l5, tiltlVtIt(' t!aiti- hhl(lfell.
In the first tvo(xpaIusioIls\e Iuiiist(liStiilghllsli ie'tweeri thu1111(1 itlitjaf perl(l (ofr((oveuv frouii the strikes and thei 't of (he
Slot).IfIC take the lust 1111(4ituolitlus aftertii' strike ('fleets had
apl)ar(,utIv slllisj(i((iits a (Itlasi-trollghl, we find, iiiI 'I? 1-21, that traiti-
nhii(s i11tc;us((i liv 11e11/r j)e!( erl(age Luau the tnittiherii J)asserlers ('l'lti)h21, line 1(t). Hut lidswits not intuit of auexpatoioti. [rider- 1i'oiuitdIi(leS( ()lltriult'd dulling fliost of thetiuiiefiatrail jOttr!levs Welt expanding (Chart 9).Iii the(011lI)il)c(itotals thuutWtare here obliged to examine (sincetraiui-tiiiles cannot heSegregatetl) there was no rise lion) onegroup of utoittlis to theIlext, CMept at theVery (!l(l lahle 2!, IltIt'sLito II)).I mtii liii' 1927qtlasi-lroiigli to tlu'930 peak, arid iikrwj'.i'Itn It33 to 1937. hitIltInlier ofjoutrIIe\s rose it greater peuentage Luautraitl-riijles (liliesI ti and I). Silloe (lie ilvcraLe length ofjtirntrprobably iIl(reast(l'vitlu Prosl)erityfxISel1- g('l-IhIiicx J)tOl)ahIvitl(rtulst(l Joule tiuuuul theIhtltlhI)ei tuf trips am! hieuue 111014' tItan ttaiii-utiil4.s\I' eon(iul(l. that.pa5sIlger trainlo;tois nor- inuihly itUtc;useill('xpilrIsiorts and derreas('iii(ohutrattiouts of travel. P.ut!oIuS of therailto;tc!s woull(j indeedhe considerablyiti(ouuVefljerl(-e(l if train ServitI'liiIlhtla(tiouI: WitsI('(111('(1illl)loj)urtioui to tiahluc. Mattets Went uitliertviscitt (lie tiit' of tile strikes.itt 1921, shortages of lou oliioti\( fueleVent,iall- for(-e(i tilt'raiIioa(1s to curtail trainseuvjt out of prOI)ortiohl to travel(liliesIto .liiI 924, \vhuenl.uilIohul WoIk('Ispan tiei1httt'tIiiitie' (lilhier stages oftilt tetieraI strike,tuajit etti'llhthtt(uIia((-Jfelloili)\' a greaterPercetitage thi;tui travelhues II to I-i).
Ihie speed ofpaseluger trains was unit uifli'oteoieuv11111(11l)v (dos iii travel (Chart 17). Again(oIi(hitto)Ils weltthimornial itttite strike troughs. Ptoi)aidv,itt alt effort ((1 setVe hiothIoc;ul and throughtu.tlIio-
6with a limited number of trailis, the railroads greatly (1!itaiIF(l lion-
stop express SerViCe. \\liatever the rCason. trains were slower than
usual, and the miles-per-hour ratio shows a net rise iii the cxj)aflsiotis,
aiit fall IF! thewuiti ar Liuus.But the eiitngc oct urrcd principally in
the immediate vicinity of the strikes, and the ratio would hardly have
fluctuated in thisav had there been no shortage of fuel for engines.
Passenger-miles per train-hour, a measure of the revenue-producing
work performed ba train and its crew during a unit of time,is the
arithmetical product of passenger-miles per train-mile and train-miles
per train-hour -- - of the load and the speed. Since the loaddiminished
in contractions, and the speed rose hut little, we must C0flCIU(le that
passenger-miles per train-hour fell. Since the load increased and the
speed also increased a little in expansions, hourly train performance
increased. The productivitY of passenger train crews, unlike that of
freight train crews. goes up in expansions and down in contractions
of traffic.4
Equipment used more of the time
Except at the coal strikes, the average load of freight ears did not
change very much. The Spce(l at winch the cars travelled diminished
in expansion and increased in contraction .Averagc hourly traffic per-
formance, tile product of the load and tile speed. must have fallen in
expansions and risemi in contractions. nilte increase in performance per
car in stock during expansions (Table 19) must havebeen achieved
entirely by keeping cars loaded and in trains a gm'eater percentage of
the time. Likewise tile fall in traffic performance per car in stock
during contractions must be attributed entirely to a decline in tile ratio
of useful to total time.
Tile average numl)er of passengers in a car no doubt increasedand
diminished with aggregate travel, and since there was little changein
speed tile average number of passenger-miles per hour of car move-
ment must have increased and diniinisheclsimilarly. Bitt the larger
number of train-miles at the peaks of travel suggests that a rise in the
The equipment of thit ish ia ilways includes horses, road wagons,and motor ii, cks
used ina rtiisg certain kinds of freightfrom consignors' business premises to railway
stations and from stauio:is to consLgnces premios. Data onthe average load per road
wagon, the averar'e load per truck,and the tonnage handled per working horse or
truck per day, have been published, for two months ofeach i-car, usually February
and September,1922to 1931, for one four-week period in1932,and for another









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Passenger Train Miles and Train Speed














24 '26 28 '30 '32 '34
Iroin Mites per Train Hour
0 Li I
1920 22 '24 '26 '28 30
E'c2ed creis C,, rc-IrorIons flnuftberCIrc.I
L rgrcrdr C ICS 4Cfl C'
1
percentage of time that cars were in operation contributed to the
higher level of travel per car in stock.
As to motive power, we have direct figures on the average number
of hours a locomotive spent in traffic per month (Chart 18) Although
we cannot date the cycles in composite traffic exactly, the number of
hours per month clearly rose in expansions arid fell in contractions.
For the major kinds of cquipnTelìt, then, the problem posed by ex-
panding trafTic was met in large part by running an existing stock of
'36 '38Stecirn Locomotives in Stock cind




cqW)meIlt for longerhours At leastthis vas thecase inI92(-38. when a wave oftraffic seldomovertopped itspredecessor.